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WARSCHEID Ismail. — Droit musulman et société au Sahara prémoderne. La justice islamique
dans les oasis du Grand Touat (Algérie) aux XVIIe-XIXesiècles. Leiden, Brill (“Studies in the
History and Society of the Maghrib, 9”), 2017, 304 p., bibl., ill.
1 An ongoing debate in African and Islamic studies has been centered on the role played
by Islam,  and particularly  “normative”  Islam,  in  the  remote regions  of  the Sahara.
Some consider that Islamization must have been shallow, a thin cover over practices
that reflected local custom, not “Islam proper.” Others point to the great production of
religious and legal texts from a wide class of scholars in many of the desert oases and
the desert edge, from M’zab in the north to Timbuktu in the south. But that, say the
critics, may just have been intellectual exercises divorced from reality, scholars sitting
in “ivory towers” while local custom dictated social practices.
2 One way of testing this is to look at the legal history of these regions. The desert oases
were on the margins or outside the reach of the states surrounding the desert, so legal
disputes  would  have  to  have  been  settled  locally.  This  explains  why  many  of  the
manuscripts that we find in the region deal with fiqh, the jurisprudence of Islamic law.
But  does  this  literature  reflect  a  local  reality,  or  were they only  just  parts  of,  and
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perhaps just copies of, theoretical discussions that took place in the central Muslim
lands?
3 In this monograph, I. Warscheid begins to answer these questions by studying a body of
pre-modern  legal  literature  from  the  Tuwat  (Touat)  oases,  today  in  southwestern
Algeria.
4 Until now, existing studies on this region have focused on Berberophone oral sources,
which were seen as “internal” to the oases, while the written texts were considered
“external.” The scholars who wrote them were assumed to have been outsiders that
had settled in the oases, but with little interaction with or impact on the customary law
it was assumed was practiced there. However, Warscheid convincingly demonstrates
that this was not the case. The literature preserved from Tuwat shows the existence of
a continuous and vibrant intellectual tradition of Islamic scholarship going back to the
thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. The scholars were indigenous to the region, and
appear as deeply embedded into its social fabric.
5 Tuwat is not a single oasis, but an oasis region with more than a dozen villages or towns
(quṣūr,  ksour). Most  of  these  had  established  Islamic  Sharia  courts  that  worked
independently from each other, each with its own judge (qāḍī), but also structured with
a “high judge” (qāḍī  al-jamāʿa) as  supreme. This  is  in accordance with the standard
structure of Islamic courts. More interesting is to what degree the regular pre-modern
duality of the Islamic legal institution could also be found. In the Shari’a court system,
the judge, qāḍī, and the jurisconsult or legal scholar, muftī, had complementary roles.
The judge decided the verdict for any individual case, while the jurisconsult advised on
the content of the law. Any party to a case, or a judge in doubt, could approach the
jurisconsult for an opinion on the correct interpretation of a rule a law, while only the
judge could apply it. Earlier scholars assumed that this muftī institution was weak or
absent in the desert regions, as they would have little use for it if local custom was the
basis for legal practice.
6 Again, Warscheid finds that this was not the case, and it is these legal opinions that are
the source and basis for his research. We do not have access to court records, the actual
decisions of the courts, before the modern period. Nevertheless, legal opinions were
preserved. Such opinions were always in writing and responses to specific questions in
individual court cases or disputes. However, the written opinions of particularly well-
renowned jurisconsults were preserved, and in many cases collected and reproduced,
often by their sons or other family members. Many of these have been preserved to this
day; Warscheid suggests that about one hundred such collections have been found in
the Sahara. For Tuwat, he bases his research on about a dozen collections spanning
from about 1700 until 1830, although some of the cases described also stem from the
seventeenth century.
7 Technically, there is a distinction between two genres of such texts. One is the fatwā, a
normative statement given by a muftī to clarify an obscure legal point. Another is the
more general report on a legal case, with the jurisconsult’s comments and views, nāzila 
(pl. nawāzil), or answer to a query (jawāb, pl. awjiba). The fatwā has a stricter form, thus
the query should in theory, at least, be anonymized and generalized: if  A does B in
circumstance  C,  what  is  the  law?  The  nāzila,  on the  other  hand,  would  be  a  more
detailed description of the facts surrounding the actual case. In the Sahara, however,
Warscheid finds that this distinction is not made. The works are generally known as
nawāzil or awjiba, but clearly functioned as fatwās, for example in that a party that was
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dissatisfied with a court’s decision could raise the issue with the jurisconsult, as a form
of appeal.
8 There is also some anonymization of the parties, but only sparingly when there is need
to avoid further conflict  or  the like;  the editor will  say then that  “the jurisconsult
mentioned  the  name  which  we  omit  here.”  Thus,  the  collections  we  have  did  go
through some editing  and selection,  we  cannot  say  that  these  were  the  totality  of
nawāzil from  the  particular  jurisconsult,  only  that  it  was  what  the  collector  found
worthy of preserving. But they do not otherwise appear to have gone through the kind
of abstraction we can find in later fatwā compendia, where only the “legally relevant”
points are preserved. Here we most often find a detailed presentation of the history
that led up to the conflict: i.e., a man owed his neighbour a sum of money, but left the
oasis without paying up. After some years, the neighbour went to the judge and claimed
some of the debtor’s garden as recompense. The neighbour’s sons and heirs protest, but
the judge decides: the creditor can take the disputed garden. A while later, a relative of
the  debtor  goes  to  the  jurisconsult  and  asks  his  opinion  about  the  legality  of  this
procedure.
9 The jurisconsult was thus an independent scholar, while the judge was an officer of the
court,  which means that the judge had the weight of the state to back him up and
implement his decisions. However, while Tuwat was at this time theoretically within
the area ruled by the Moroccan sultan,  state power was light if  at  all  present.  The
judges  collected  some  taxes,  and  there  were  occasions  where  the  sultan  made  his
opinions known by letter but, by and large, the oasis ruled itself. So, what was then the
basis for the judge’s authority? Who appointed him in the first place?
10 It appears that the position of judge was largely hereditary and passed automatically
from father to son. The sultan could formally appoint a member of the family early on,
or such appointment could be made long after the fact. The sultan encouraged such
arrangements, and it would appear that the oasis dwellers also accepted the authority
of the judge-families, although there may have been disagreements as to which village-
judge a case belonged, thus reflecting some rivalries between judges and villages.
11 Tuwat, while far into the desert, was also not at all isolated as trans-Saharan trade was
one of the main economic bases for the oasis. Many of its religious scholars had also
studied in Fez or other scholarly centres and gained scholarly legitimacy through this.
The scholarly families thus represented an intellectual class, and they cooperated in
scholarly “councils” (shura), but also frequently bickered between families or scholars.
12 In addition, each village also had a council of local notables, the jama’a that could make
decisions. They did not have authority to try cases, but could, if necessary, take over a
judge’s functions if there was no judge present in the village. If so, the muftī or legal
scholar, often then sitting in another town, could function as an instance of appeal.
13 As for the types of cases that were included in the nawāzil collections, they are mostly
about property; inheritance disputes, conflicts over sale and similar, and very often
connected  to  family  disputes.  Penal law,  crimes  and  such  seldom  appear, nor  do
disputes concerning the division of natural  resources or agricultural  land.  As many
cases concern family property, it is natural that women also play a significant part.
They go to court to sue their husbands, or their families, or others for their rights.
Mostly,  they also appear in person,  although a few women did approach the court
through  family  members  or  other  representatives,  which  opens  the  question  of
whether there was conflict between husband and wife, or their families behind them.
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Mostly, however, the court cases show clearly that the courts were arenas of women’s
agency in the pre-modern Islamic world of Tuwat.
14 The nawāzil show that the legal scholars were closely integrated into their community.
That opens up another long-standing discussion: does the judge (and the muftī) try to
impose an “imported” set of Islamic legal rules, or does he work more as a social agent;
seeking out whichever solution does most good to the community and he finds fair for
the  parties,  irrespective  of  what  the  “books”  say.  Both positions  are  found  among
scholars of Islamic law in the Maghreb.
15 Warscheid takes somewhat of a middle position between the two. It is clear, he says,
that  the  legal  scholars  work  on  the  basis  of  the  established  rules  of  Islamic
jurisprudence as they always argue from and justify their opinions within the same
system of Islamic legal discussion you can find anywhere in the Islamic world. At the
same time, they make an effort to use the concept of custom, ‘urf, to make these general
laws fit the social reality in the region. In Islamic legal scholarship, the rules of fiqh are
universal, but their application can or must, under some circumstances, be adapted to
local conditions. An employer must give a worker “fair wages,” and a landlord claim
only “fair rent” from his tenants. But what “fair wage” and “fair rent” mean is not
settled  absolutely  since  these  must  be  decided  on the  basis  of  local  practice  and
circumstance.  This  kind  of  opening  is  clearly  used  actively  by  the  jurisconsults  of
Tuwat. They are not indiscriminate in their distinction between ‘urf custom, which is
what  conforms  to  the  principles  of  Islamic  law,  and  ‘āda custom,  which  are  local
customs that cannot be integrated into the legal argument.
16 For Warscheid, this adaptation of custom to Islamic law, or even more, adaptation of
Islamic law to social  reality,  is  the core function of the nawāzil.  What they do is  to
“déchiffrer le social pour le convertir en normatif” (p. 267). This is a central conclusion
to his work, and if one could make one further wish for this outstanding book, it would
be that the author develop the concepts of ‘urf as used in the Tuwat nawāzil a bit more
comparatively, including the wider discussion of the role of ‘urf (and ‘āda) in Islamic
law. He touches upon it, but it is a far-reaching and very important issue, also outside
of the Maghreb.
17 This work is a fascinating study that at the same time addresses a number of important,
and  controversial,  topics  such  as  how  a  peripheral  desert  community  represented
strictly  codified  structures,  for  example,  an  Islamic  court  and  the  nature  of  “state
authority” (the court) in a non-state society; and the relation between Islamic norms
and social reality on the margins of the Muslim world. There are few if any studies of
pre-modern Saharan society that have in this way combined Islamic scholarship and
social history. Warscheid’s book will become required reading for anyone interested in
the history of the Sahara, and should also be central as a comparative case study for
those working on Islamic law, scholarship and society south of the desert.
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